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Many people believe mobile healthcare (mHealth)
would help alleviate the rising cost of healthcare and
improve the quality of service. Bluetooth, which is the
most popular wireless technology for personal medical
devices, is used for most of the mHealth sensing applica-
tions. In this paper we raise the question – Is Bluetooth
the right technology for mHealth? To instigate the dis-
cussion we discuss some shortcomings of Bluetooth and
also point out an alternative solution.
1 Introduction
Today there is a broad interest in electronic medi-
cal records and in the potential for mobile healthcare
(mHealth) to provide more accurate, more pervasive
health data. As a general model for personal medical
monitoring systems, users either have on-body or in-
body sensors that send the data wirelessly to an aggre-
gator device, which usually is envisioned as a mobile
phone. Users can then share that data with their doc-
tor by sending it directly or by uploading the data to a
server.
In many mHealth sensing applications Bluetooth
is used for collecting data from sensors into mobile
phones. One of the main reasons for using Bluetooth is
because it has a large user base, as it is available in most
modern cellphones. Any solution that uses Bluetooth is
easily adoptable.
Bluetooth was developed to replace cables and is
a commonly used wireless technology for a Personal
Area Network (PAN). But is it the right technology for
mHealth? In this paper we wish to stimulate a discus-
sion by suggesting that Bluetooth might not be the best
technology for a Body Area Network (BAN)1 and en-
courage researchers to improve Bluetooth or look for
better alternatives. We do so by pointing out some short-
comings of Bluetooth in a mobile health context. We
also touch upon an alternative to Bluetooth that is in
primitive stages but looks promising.
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1Sensors and an aggregator device used for mHealth sens-
ing together form a BAN.
2 Problems with Bluetooth
Bluetooth transmits data in the 2.4GHz frequency
band – a communication band also used by other wire-
less technologies and which can be monitored by an at-
tacker. This makes it hard to provide security, privacy,
and resistance to interference. We have several concerns
about Bluetooth.
Secure pairing is important, as during pairing two
devices share a key that is used to secure communica-
tion between them for a session. Bluetooth supports
four pairing models – Numeric Comparison, Just Works,
Out of Band and Passkey Entry. The ‘Just Works’ (JW)
model is designed to support devices that do not have
any input-output capabilities. Unless medical sensors
can be equipped with a display or an input capability or
some other out-of-band channel, which Bluetooth can
use for pairing, the sensors will have to use the JW
model for pairing. Unfortunately, with JW model an
attacker can falsify the input-output capabilities of his
device and use this association model to launch man-
in-the-middle attacks [6]. Furthermore, Bluetooth uses
a stream cipher called E0 for encrypting the payload;
NIST considers the stream cipher E0 to be a weak en-
cryption algorithm and recommends use of a more ro-
bust algorithm [8]. Some other security weaknesses in-
clude negotiable key length, allowed repeated authenti-
cation attempts, and battery depletion attacks [3, 8].
Medical data is highly sensitive. Even the disclosure
of the type of sensor a person is using, let alone the sen-
sor data, can have privacy implications. So privacy is
an important aspect of mHealth sensing. Bluetooth de-
vices, when in discoverable mode, respond to queries
by disclosing information such as their name, address,
local clock and other characteristics needed to connect
to it. Bluetooth devices have a 48-bit unique Bluetooth
Device Address (BD ADDR) that can be used to iden-
tify the manufacturer and hence may be used to identify
the type of sensor. These unique addresses can be used
to link all sensor data back to one device and maybe to
one user. It can also be used for tracking location of the
device, if the device’s BD ADDR is observed by sev-
eral Bluetooth base stations in different locations. For
these reasons it is recommended that Bluetooth devices
be operated in non-discoverable mode, however, even in
non-discoverable mode it is possible to identify the de-
vice address using software defined radio or commercial
scanning tools [7].
Most Bluetooth devices operate in Class 2 mode,
which has a range of 10 meters. Although a shorter-
range Class 3 (1 meter) is possible, its lower transmis-
sion power can make communication lossy due to the at-
tenuation caused by human body.2. In either case, an at-
tacker can use range extension techniques to eavesdrop
on Bluetooth communication even kilometers away [4].
As a wireless technology, Bluetooth has to deal
with interference. It uses Adaptive Frequency Hop-
ping (AFH) to detect channels with interference and re-
moves them from its hopping sequence. This works well
against interference from sources such as Wi-Fi and Zig-
bee, but it does not make Bluetooth resistant to interfer-
ence from other Bluetooth piconets that cause interfer-
ence on different channels. Thus, interference can be a
problem in crowded places, such as hospitals and sub-
ways, affecting the quality of service of a BAN.
Scalability is also a concern for Bluetooth. A Blue-
tooth device can talk to only seven other devices at a
time and so this limits the number of sensors a per-
son’s BAN can use concurrently. This number seems
adequate for now, but it may be a constraint in the fu-
ture. Power consumption is another concern for existing
Bluetooth devices. Bluetooth v3.0 or earlier versions are
inefficient in terms of their power utilization. Bluetooth
v4.0, also called ‘Bluetooth Low Energy’, was released
recently. How quickly it will be adopted remains to be
seen.
A majority of cell phones in use today have older
versions of Bluetooth (v2.0 or earlier). In addition to
the security concerns mentioned above, these older ver-
sions have many security flaws that can be exploited by
an attacker to gain access to the data in the device or
even gain control of the device [4, 8]. Bluetooth v2.1,
released in 2007, provides an improvement in terms of
security by introducing the Secure Simple Pairing mod-
els and Security Mode 4 (service level enforced secu-
rity) [1], but it is still not secure enough. In addition
to the vulnerabilities listed by NIST [8], the JW model
is the weak link in the security design of Bluetooth (in-
cluding v4.0).
Later versions of Bluetooth focus on higher data rate
and data reliability (v3.0), and power (v4.0). For Blue-
tooth v4.0 the overall Bluetooth stack is optimized for
power efficiency: the PHY design is changed so that ra-
dios will consume less power. As a result, v4.0 divides
the 2.4GHz band in 40 channels instead of 79 chan-
nels [9], which might be more prone to interference.
3 Proposed solution
With some changes to the Bluetooth specifications,
Bluetooth could be more secure and privacy preserv-
ing. Adopting protocols such as Sly-Fi [5], which are
designed for preserving privacy, and using standard en-
cryption algorithms such as AES for encrypting pay-
2The human body attenuates radio communications in
2.4Ghz band, used by Bluetooth.
load, can help make Bluetooth a better wireless tech-
nology for mHeath sensing.
As an alternative technology for a BAN, it may be
possible to establish a communication channel through
the body itself. One form of Body Coupled Commu-
nication (BCC) [2], for example, uses a 23 MHz chan-
nel through the skin. Since the range of such a channel
is limited to the body, it inherently provides better se-
curity and privacy, and there may be less interference
compared to a wireless radio channel. It also resolves
the problem of secure pairing of devices, which is one
of the security weaknesses of Bluetooth, and makes it
easier (compared to radio) to identify whether sensors
are on the same body. There is much to study about such
body-based communications, such as their effects on the
human body, before they can be widely adopted. Fur-
thermore, many such techniques require skin contact,
which may be difficult or impossible for certain kinds
of devices. Nonetheless this technology looks promis-
ing.
4 Conclusion
Older versions of Bluetooth, still present in a ma-
jority of deployed devices, have serious security flaws.
The newer versions of Bluetooth still have some secu-
rity flaws, pose privacy risks, and hence are not ideal for
mHealth sensing applications. Alternative technologies
such as body-coupled communication look promising
but would need extensive experimentation before they
are ready to use.
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